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26096 7590 07/14/2009 CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.			EXAM	IINER
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1	UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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4	BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
5	AND INTERFERENCES
6	
7	
8	Ex parte NANCY L. SAXON, STEVEN G. SAIEG,
9	CRAIG HOLT and BRADEN J. BROMLEY
10	
11	
12	Appeal 2008-003588
13	Application 10/658,306
14	Technology Center 3600
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16	
17	Decided: July 14, 2009
18	
19	
20	Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge
21	and JOHN C. KERINS, and FRED A. SILVERBERG, Administrative
22	Patent Judges.
23	
24	SILVERBERG, Administrative Patent Judge.
25	
26	
27	DECISION ON APPEAL

The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).

1	STATEMENT OF THE CASE
2	Nancy L. Saxon et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C.
3	§ 134 of the final rejection of claims 14 and 16-26. Claims 1-13 and 15 have
4	been withdrawn. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).
5	
6	SUMMARY OF DECISION
7	We AFFIRM.
8	
9	THE INVENTION
10	The Appellants' claimed invention is directed to a reinforced slider
11	frame for a tractor-trailer slider assembly (Spec.: ¶ [1]).
12	The invention is readily understood by reference to Figure 7, and
13	Claim 14.
14	Figure 7 is reproduced below:
15 16	Figure 7 shows the elected species ² of the slider frame 12 (Spec. 7-8:
17	¶ [27]).

² On December 8, 2005, the species shown in Figure 7 was elected without traverse in response to an election of species requirement mailed November 8, 2005.

Claim 14, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject 1 2 matter: 3 14. A suspension slider for a vehicle trailer comprising: 4 first and second spaced apart longitudinal members each 5 including a downwardly depending hanger for supporting 6 forward and rearward suspension assemblies; and 7 structure interconnecting said first and second spaced 8 apart longitudinal members, said structure including a 9 continuous wall forming first and second angled portions 10 converging to a central portion, said continuous wall secured to said first and second spaced apart longitudinal members. 11 12 13 THE REJECTIONS 14 The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of 15 unpatentability: 16 Hutchens US 3,406,439 Oct. 22, 1968 17 US 3,856,344 Loeber Dec. 24, 1974 18 US 4,919,445 Apr. 24, 1990 Robey 19 Christenson Nov. 26, 1991 US 5,067,740 20 VanDenberg US 5,718,445 Feb. 17, 1998 21 Pierce US 5,720,489 Feb. 24, 1998 22 Garcia US 5,722,688 Mar. 3, 1998 23 24 The following rejections by the Examiner are before us: 25 1. Claims 14 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Robey in view of VanDenberg. 26 27 2. Claims 14, 16 and 21-23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 28 being unpatentable over Christenson in view of Hutchens. 29 3. Claims 17, 18, 20, 24 and 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 30 being unpatentable over Christenson in view of Hutchens, and further 31 in view of Garcia.

1	4. Claim 25 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
2	over Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view
3	of Loeber.
4	5. Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
5	over Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view
6	of Pierce.
7	
8	ISSUES
9	The issues before us are: (1) whether the Examiner has articulated a
10	reason with rational underpinning to provide Robey's sliding frame with the
11	hangers of VanDenberg as called for in claim 14 (App. Br. 4), (2) whether
12	the Examiner has articulated a reason with rational underpinning to provide
13	Christenson's slider frame with the hangers of Hutchens as called for in
14	claim 14 (App. Br. 6), and (3) whether the Examiner has articulated a reason
15	with rational underpinning to provide the combined teachings of
16	Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia with the triangular braces of Pierce as
17	called for in claim 19 (App. Br. 6).
18	
19	FINDINGS OF FACT
20	We find that the following enumerated findings are supported by at
21	least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d
22	1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for
23	proceedings before the Office).
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25	
26	

1	The App	pellants' Admissions
2	1.	Christenson describes suspension mounts 86 and suspension
3		members 87 (fig. 7), but does not describe what the suspension
4		configuration is or how it is secured to a frame (App. Br. 6).
5	The Exa	aminer's Findings
6	Clair	ms 14 and 16
7	2.	The Examiner finds that Robey schematically describes a support
8		26 for front and rear suspensions 20, 24 (Ans. 3).
9	3.	The Examiner finds that since Robey only describes the support 26
10		schematically, Robey does not describe two downwardly
11		depending hangers as called for in claim 14 (Ans. 3).
12	4.	The Examiner finds that VanDenberg describes that hangers 5, 6
13		are well known in the tandem axle art (Ans. 3-4), and that
14		VanDenberg attributes to the suspension the advantages of roll
15		stability and resistance to lateral deflection (Ans. 7).
16	5.	The Examiner finds that combining the teachings of Robey and
17		VanDenberg by replacing Robey's suspension system with a
18		tandem axle suspension and hangers as taught by VanDenberg
19		would provide Robey with the advantage of a tandem axle that is
20		roll stable and resistant to lateral deflection (VanDenberg, col. 1, 11
21		7-14) (Ans. 4).
22	Clair	ms 14, 16 and 21-23
23	6.	The Examiner implicitly finds that Christenson describes all of the
24		limitations called for in claim 14 except that Christenson does not
25		describe hangers that support front and rear suspensions (Ans. 4).

1	7.	The Examiner finds that Hutchens describes integral hangers 44
2		that support front and rear tandem axle suspensions, wherein the
3		integral hangers 44 are useful because they provide for the
4		production of a suspension unit with a minimum number of parts
5		and fabricating steps (Ans. 4).
6	8.	The Examiner finds that to modify the slider 70 of Christenson to
7		include integral hangars as taught by Hutchens at 44 would provide
8		Christenson with a suspension unit with a minimum number of
9		parts (Ans. 4).
10	Clair	n 19
11	9.	The Examiner implicitly finds that the combined teachings of
12		Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia describe all of the limitations
13		called for in claim 19 except that the combined teachings of
14		Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia do not describe triangular
15		shaped braces as called for in claim 19 (Ans. 6).
16	10.	The Examiner finds that Pierce describes that it is known in the
17		slider frame art to provide triangular braces 170, which are used to
18		provide additional strength to the slider frame (Ans. 6, 9).
19	11.	The Examiner finds that to modify the combined teachings of
20		Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia to include triangular shaped
21		braces as taught by Pierce at 170 would provide additional strength
22		to the slider (Ans. 6).
23	This Boo	ard's Findings
24	12.	Robey describes an undercarriage including a sliding frame 22
25		overlying wheels and axles 24 joined to the depending limit of the

1		frame 22 in a conventional manner by a spring and shackle
2		assembly 26 (col. 3, ll. 16-22 and figs. 1-2).
3	13.	Appellants have not contested the Examiner's findings as to the
4		teachings of Robey, Christenson or Pierce (Reply Br. 1-3 and App.
5		Br. 4-7).
6	14.	Appellants have neither contested the rejection of claims 17, 18,
7		20, 24 and 26 over Christenson in view of Hutchens, and further in
8		view of Garcia, nor contested the rejection of claim 25 over the
9		teachings of Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and
10		further in view of Loeber (App. Br. 4).
11	15.	Additional findings as necessary appear in the Analysis portion of
12		this opinion.
13		
14		PRINCIPLES OF LAW
15	Appellar	nts' Burden
16	\mathbf{A}_{i}	ppellants have the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate
17	error in	the Examiner's position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86
18	(Fed. Ci	r. 2006) ("On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a
19	rejection	[under § 103] by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie
20	obviousi	ness or by rebutting the <i>prima facie</i> case with evidence of secondary
21	indicia o	of nonobviousness.") (quoting <i>In re Rouffet</i> , 149 F.3d 1350, 1355
22	(Fed. Ci	r. 1998)). See also Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d 1606, 1614
23	(BPAI 2	008) [burden on appeal] (on appeal, applicant must show examiner
24	erred); E	Ex parte Fu, 89 USPQ2d 1115, 1123 (BPAI 2008); Ex parte Catan,
25	83 USPO	Q2d 1569, 1577 (BPAI 2007); and <i>Ex parte Smith</i> , 83 USPQ2d
26	1509, 15	519 (BPAI 2007).

1 **Obviousness** 2 "Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences 3 between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such 4 that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 5 invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 6 7 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying 8 factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, 9 (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) 10 the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary 11 considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See 12 also KSR, 550 U.S. at 406-407 ("While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors continue to 13 14 define the inquiry that controls."). 15 In KSR, the Supreme Court stated that "when a patent claims a 16 structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere 17 substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result." Id. at 416 (citing United 18 19 States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966)). 20 In KSR the Supreme Court held that "if a technique has been used to 21 improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize 22 that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is 23 obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." KSR, 550 24 U.S. at 417.

1	In <i>KSR</i> , the Supreme Court stated that:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.
11	Id. at 418. The Court noted that "[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should
12	be made explicit." <i>Id.</i> (citing <i>In re Kahn</i> , 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
13	("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
14	conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
15	with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
16	obviousness.")). However, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
17	directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
18	can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
19	ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
20	In KSR, the Supreme Court stated that:
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the <i>Graham</i> analysis. But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.
31	<i>Id.</i> at 419.
32	

I	ANALYSIS
2	Appellants argue claims 14, 16-18 and 20-26 as a group. As such, we
3	select claim 14 as representative of the group, and claims 16-18 and 20-26
4	will stand or fall with claim 14. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007). The
5	Appellants argue claim 19 separately.
6	
7 8	Rejection of claims 14 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Robey in view of VanDenberg
9	Robey schematically describes a support 26 for front and rear
10	suspensions 20, 24 (Fact 2). The Examiner found that since Robey only
11	describes the support 26 schematically, Robey does not describe two
12	downwardly depending hangers as called for in claim 14 (Fact 3). The
13	Examiner found that VanDenberg describes that hangers 5, 6 are well known
14	in the tandem axle art (Fact 4).
15	Appellants have not contested the Examiner's findings as to the
16	teachings of Robey (Fact 13).
17	Appellants contend that there is no motivation to modify Robey to
18	provide the hangers of VanDenberg (App. Br. 4). To the extent the
19	Appellants are arguing for a rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-
20	motivation test, this argument is not persuasive in light of the Court's
21	decision in KSR. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (holding that it is error to apply
22	the teaching-suggestion-motivation test as a rigid formula to limit the
23	obviousness inquiry).
24	Appellants further contend that the Examiner's rationale for
25	combining the teachings of Robey and VanDenberg was in error as the roll
26	stability, which is the argued motivation, is not attributable to the hangers
27	(App. Br. 5). Appellants still further contend that the Examiner has not

1	provided a valid reason for combining the teachings of Robey and
2	VanDenberg (Reply Br. 2).
3	The Examiner's proposed combination is the substitution of
4	VanDenberg's slider suspension for Robey's conventional slider
5	suspension ³ . We see no error in the Examiner's finding that VanDenberg
6	attributes to the suspension the advantages of roll stability and resistance to
7	lateral deflection (Fact 4). Further, we see no error in the Examiner's
8	finding that combining the teachings of Robey and VanDenberg would yield
9	in Robey the predictable result of the suspension advantages taught by
10	VanDenberg (Fact 5).
11	The modification proposed by the Examiner is the simple substitution
12	of one known suspension system for another to perform the same function of
13	suspending a vehicle, and thereby yields predictable results. See KSR, 550
14	U.S. at 416 (the claimed combination of known structure altered by the mere
15	substitution of one element for another known structure must do more than
16	yield a predictable result).
17	Therefore, we conclude that the Appellants have not demonstrated
18	that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 14 over Robey in view of
19	VanDenberg. The Appellants have likewise not demonstrated error in the
20	Examiner's rejection of claim 16, which falls with claim 14.
21 22 23	Rejection of claims 14, 16 and 21-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Christenson in view of Hutchens
24	The Examiner implicitly found that Christenson describes all of the
25	limitations called for in claim 14 except that Christenson does not describe
26	hangers that support front and rear suspensions (Fact 6). The Examiner
	³ See Fact 12 for Robey's suspension being conventional.

¹¹

- 1 further found that Hutchens describes integral hangers 44 that support front
- 2 and rear tandem axle suspensions, wherein the integral hangers 44 are useful
- 3 because they provide for the production of a suspension unit with a
- 4 minimum number of parts and fabricating steps (Fact 7).
- Appellants have not contested the Examiner's findings as to the teachings of Christenson (Fact 13).
- 7 Appellants contend that there is no motivation to modify Christenson
- 8 to provide the hangers of Hutchens (App. Br. 6). To the extent the
- 9 Appellants are arguing for a rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-
- motivation test, this argument is not persuasive in light of the Court's
- 11 decision in *KSR*. 550 U.S. at 419.
- 12 Appellants further contend that they have rebutted the Examiner's
- initial finding of obviousness, and that the Examiner has failed to support a
- prima facie case of obviousness (App. Br. 5). In a Final Rejection, an
- 15 Examiner sets forth a final conclusion of obviousness, not a prima facie case
- of obviousness. A final conclusion of obviousness is based on the totality of
- 17 the record.⁴ We conclude that the Examiner reached a proper final
- 18 conclusion of obviousness based on the record.
- 19 Appellants still further contend that there is no reason why one of
- 20 ordinary skill would combine Christenson and Hutchens (Reply Br. 2).
- 21 Appellants still further contend that there is nothing in either Christenson or

⁴ After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response to an examiner's prima facie case, the examiner determines patentability on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of the evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of the applicant's arguments. See *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). MPEP § 716.01(d) describes how the examiner is to make a final determination of obviousness.

Hutchens that would indicate that Christenson would benefit from the 1 2 hangers of Hutchens (App. Br. 6). 3 The Examiner's proposed combination is to modify the slider 70 of 4 Christenson to include integral hangars as taught by Hutchens at 44 (Fact 8). 5 As Appellants admit, Christenson describes suspension mounts 86 and 6 suspension members 87, but does not describe how the suspension is secured 7 to a frame (Fact 1). We see no error in the Examiner's finding that 8 Hutchens' integral hangers provide a suspension unit with a minimum 9 number of parts (Fact 7). In particular, we find that Hutchens' integral 10 hangers provide a way of securing a suspension unit to a frame with a minimum number of parts. Further, we see no error in the Examiner's 11 12 finding that combining the teachings of Christenson and Hutchens would yield in Christenson the predictable result of a suspension unit being secured 13 14 to a frame with a minimum number of parts as taught by Hutchens (Fact 7). 15 The modification proposed by the Examiner is nothing more than the 16 simple substitution of one known element (suspension unit) for another to 17 perform the same function of suspending a vehicle, and thereby yields predictable results, or the mere application of a known technique to a piece 18 19 of prior art ready for the improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 417. See 20 also Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 21 (1969) (paving repair apparatus consisting of a combination of three known 22 elements, all performing their established functions in the combination, held obvious). 23 24 Therefore, we conclude that the Appellants have not demonstrated 25 that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 14 over Christenson in view of

1	Hutchens. The Appellants have likewise not demonstrated error in the
2	Examiner's rejection of claims 16 and 21-23, which fall with claim 14.
3 4 5 6 7 8	Rejection of claims 17, 18, 20, 24 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Christenson in view of Hutchens, and further in view of Garcia, and the Rejection of claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Loeber
9	Appellants have contested neither the rejection of claims 17, 18, 20,
10	24 and 26 over Christenson in view of Hutchens, and further in view of
11	Garcia, nor the rejection of claim 25 over the teachings of Christenson in
12	view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Loeber (Fact 14).
13	Therefore, we conclude that Appellants have not demonstrated that the
14	Examiner erred in rejecting claims 17, 18, 20, 24 and 26 over Christenson in
15	view of Hutchens, and further in view of Garcia, and claim 25 over
16	Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Loeber.
17 18 19	Rejection of claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Pierce
20	The Examiner implicitly found that the combined teachings of
21	Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia describe almost all of the limitations
22	called for in claim 19 except that the combined teachings of Christenson,
23	Hutchens and Garcia do not describe triangular shaped braces as called for
24	in claim 19 (Fact 9). The Examiner further found that Pierce describes that
25	it is known in the slider frame art to provide triangular braces 170, which are
26	used to provide additional strength to the slider frame (Fact 10).
27	Appellants have not contested the Examiner's findings as to the
28	teachings of Pierce (Fact 13)

1	Appellants contend that nothing in Pierce would suggest or motivate
2	one of ordinary skill to incorporate Pierce's triangular-shaped braces at the
3	location called for in claim 19 (App. Br. 6-7). To the extent the Appellants
4	are arguing for a rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test
5	this argument is not persuasive in light of the Court's decision in KSR. 550
6	U.S. at 419.
7	Appellants further contend that one of ordinary skill would only use a
8	brace where absolutely needed, and that the Examiner has not given a reason
9	as to why one of ordinary skill would use a brace where claimed (Reply Br.
10	3).
11	The Examiner's proposed combination is to modify the combined
12	teachings of Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia to include triangular braces
13	as taught by Pierce at 170 (Fact 11). We see no error in the Examiner's
14	finding that Pierce's triangular braces (reinforcement box) 170 provide
15	additional strength to the slider frame. A person having ordinary skill in the
16	slider frame art would know to add a triangular brace to a slider frame where
17	additional strength was needed. Therefore, we see no error in the
18	Examiner's finding that combining the teachings of Christenson, Hutchens,
19	Garcia and Pierce would yield in Christenson the predictable result of a
20	slider frame having additional strength as taught by Pierce (Fact 11).
21	The modification proposed by the Examiner is simply the predictable
22	use of a triangular brace between two elements according to its established
23	function to provide additional strength to obtain predictable results. See
24	<i>KSR</i> , 550 U.S. at 416.

1	Therefore, we conclude that the Appellants have not demonstrated
2	that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 19 over Christenson in view of
3	Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Pierce.
4 5	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
6	Appellants have not established that the Examiner erred in articulating
7	a reason with rational underpinning that would have led a person of ordinary
8	skill in the art to: (1) provide Robey's sliding frame with the hangers of
9	VanDenberg as called for in claim 14, (2) provide Christenson's slider frame
10	with the hangers of Hutchens as called for in claim 14, and (3) provide the
11	combined teachings of Christenson, Hutchens and Garcia with the triangular
12	braces of Pierce as called for in claim 19.
13 14	DECISION
15	The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 14 and 16 over Robey
16	in view of VanDenberg; claims 14, 16 and 21-23 over Christenson in view
17	of Hutchens; claims 17, 18, 20, 24 and 26 over Christenson in view of
18	Hutchens, and further in view of Garcia; claim 25 over Christenson in view
19	of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Loeber; and claim 19 over
20	Christenson in view of Hutchens and Garcia, and further in view of Pierce, is
21	affirmed.
22	No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
23	this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007).
24	
25	<u>AFFIRMED</u>
26	
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